Deep learning compilers (DLCs) have become the standard approach for optimizing edge inference performance, employing techniques such as operator fusion, loop tiling, and scheduling to meet stringent resource constraints. Yet, the security implications of these optimizations remain largely unexplored.
In this work, we investigate shared-memory side-channel attacks on edge SoCs and analyze how compiler optimizations reshape the leakage surface. Our study reveals that identical operators can exhibit distinct shared-resource access patterns under different compilation strategies, resulting in divergent attack outcomes. To address this, we introduce the Confusion Variance Score (CVS), a metric that quantifies compilation-induced security by measuring confusion in time-series resource traces (e.g., DRAM bandwidth). CVS integrates multidimensional dynamic time warping with statistical morphological features to ensure temporal robustness, and shows a strong negative correlation (Spearman $r \approx -0.9394$) with practical attack error rates. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of CVS-guided compilation in TVM and TensorRT, achieving a 24~% increase in attack error rate compared to default strategies, while limiting inference latency overhead to under 5~%.